The Indochinese Communist Party

Project: The Indochinese Communist Party
Author: Lem Chuck Moth

Started date: September/01/2013
Last updated: November/31/2015
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Note:
Since this paper is still drafted, the readers would be advised to ignore any context errors. The content is not final and subjected to be reviewed.

The modern history of Vietnam was presented as a continuous series of struggles against foreign superpowers. Among the villains were China, the Mongols, Japan, France and America (WWWA: North Vietnam: P.264). Included in the claim are the final victories that after a long struggle, the Vietnamese people always managed to win over foreign aggressors. In a closer look, it was the same history of all small Southeast Asian countries being victimized by world superpowers' quest for supremacy. The difference is that other countries were not that successful in dealing with the world-class aggression as Vietnam does. Of Indianized background, native states succumbed under foreign aggression one after the other while Vietnam took on the opportunity to complete its Nam-tien project that was, of its own nature, an aggression against its southern neighbors. By a large, the Vietnamese history was about the collaboration of the Viet aristocrats and the fight to free themselves from one rising power to the next. From the beginning, it was the Han Chinese that built Tonkin to become the southern seaport of China that became known as Dai-viet during the high of the Han Empire. In the process, the Han drove down the Kun-lun people from the southern part of China to the present day Cochinchina and repopulated the Red River Delta with Chinese migrants from Central China. To make a southern province of China, the Han placed them under the control of the Yueh aristocrat from the Tai-Yuan country. During the decline of the Han Chinese, Dai-viet fell next into the Tang' s control until the Le court fought to free itself and remained independent after the fall of the Tang Dynasty. From then on, the history of Vietnam was a series of repetitive deal with foreign powers in the fight against the native peoples for the land that constituted what is Vietnam of today. During the Mongol' s incursion, Dai-viet seeks Kublai Khan' s intervention to run over Champapura but fought against the Yuan court when the deal became sour. After the fall of the Mongolian Empire, Dai-viet started its Nan-tien campaign against southern states. Using the Ming Chinese protection, they started conniving on the welfare of neighboring states such as the kingdom of Lan-xang, Champapura and Cambodia. After the decline of the Ming, Dai-viet invaded Champapura and Prey Nokor with the Chou Dynasty in support. Nevertheless, the transformation was not completed without the interference from western powers. To achieve their goal, we shall argue that the collaboration with the colonial rule was as well established as the subordination with imperialist China in the past. Also missing in their modern history is the cleverness of manipulating superpowers of the free and communist blocks during the Cold War to complete the Nam-Tien project.

The Communist Dilemma
As had been done in the past, political joggling between world powers was Vietnam ' s specialty. Now that the world is fragmented under the Cold War, the joggling game became even more beneficial to the skillful players. We shall see that since the birth of its nation, Vietnam was equipped with the right cultural setting to take on the New World crisis. We shall argue that with the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, Vietnamese Performance would be brought to a new level. Through the Cold War, Ho saw the opportunity for Vietnam to expand itself at the expense of the French Indochina. As partisanship was eminent in the New World order, the choice of making alliance with the communist bloc was obviously one of Ho Chi Minh ' s best bet. Through communism, Ho foreseen the next two Indochinese wars to be under way that would at the end deliver the French Indochina into Vietminh' s control. All he needed was a rising power to sponsor the project and the Comintern was what he had in mind. To no avail, the task was not easy even to the cleverness of Ho. The first attempt to fit Vietnam into the commintern' s community failed. Ho Chi Minh' s petition for a Vietnamese communist state (as a satellite of the Soviet Union) was flatly denied by Stalin. At the time that colonialization was outdated through the communist doctrine, the suggestion of Vietnam to take care of the French Indochina on behalf of the Commintern was at first politically unacceptable. Despite the setback, Ho did not loose hope. His Confucianist rationality told him that the communist ideology had its time to shine but its dark time was also around the corner. Fortunately, the emergence of the Chinese communist party provided another chance to his secret mission. Through Chinese revolution, Maoism allowed the agrarian state to join in the communist world (Notes: Agriculturist society vs Communism). With Chinese support, the winning of the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1945 gave Ho' s a jump-start with his own communist ambition. It became an opportunity of a lifetime for the nationalist Ho to complete the Nam-Tian project through the land reform of Communism. By then, capitalism had already made Russia becoming one the world economic powers. Nevertheless, Ho needed to wait for another worldly event to receive total support from Russia for his colonial project. In direct rivalry with America, revisionism soon taking place after Khrushchev took power (Pol: Germinal: P. 147). When he was ousted, the next president Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982) brought revisionism to a new high. The change hit China into the core of its ideological setting. While continuing on its progressive communist drive, China broke its tie from the Soviet Union. The Vietminh leadership saw the conflict as a new opportunity to forge alliance with the Commintern. With his clairvoyance, Ho transformed the Vietminh into becoming one of the best fit among the contemporary political parties of the world.

THE INDOCHINESE AFFAIR
In the fight against France, the Vietminh did not fight alone. Working for the Grand Alliance, Ho Chi Minh was able to regroup many factions of Indochinese fighters to join in the Vietnamese cause. Just as members of the Pathet Lao in Laos and the Khmer Issarac in Cambodia, the indigenous recruits traced theirs roots mostly from the resistance against the French colonial rule during the World War II. Taking over the free movements against European rule that were loosely controlled by the Japanese troops, the Vietminh converted them later into communist fighters. It was neither by chances nor by interest that these Indochinese communist fighters joined in the Vietminh to form the communist coalition of Indochina. We shall argue that the Indochinese Communist Party was actually Ho Chi Minh' s long term planning for the formation of the communist state of Indochina under the control of Hanoi.

The Indochinese Liberation Front
By now we know that Ho Chi Minh spent most of his early career life as double agent for both the free and communist world. In the fight against the fascist regime, Ho used the best of his spying skills to conduct his campaign through secret organization. From the very beginning, he sent secret agents all over Indochina to start campaigning and developing resistance that would support his cause. Disguising themselves as local leadership, Vietminh agents created unrest in the whole of French Indochina in the form of guerrilla fighting. In Cambodia and Laos where Buddhism became the devotion of the people, Viet agents often took the time to convert themselves as Buddhist monks. Their strategy was to use the "ruthless exploitation by French imperialists in Indochina" as propaganda to induce the Indochinese fighters in becoming progressively revolutionary to support the war effort against the French colonial rule. Nevertheless, their communist agenda was extended to include the conversion of Indochina into a member of the communist party as well. From the Khmer source, it is said that Ho Chi Minh had tried to approach Son Ngoc Thanh in joining force to expel the French authority from Indochina (Angka: Vietnam started to invade neighboring states: P. 18). Knowing very well about the fate of his Khmer Krom compatriots as becoming subject to communism, he rejected Ho' s proposal. Under communist development, their lands were subject to redistribution and their tradition was subject to be wiped out along with their Khmer identity. Under the colonial rule, they still at least able to retain through constant fighting with the Vietnamese authority, their land and identity. The only way to prevent that from happening was to claim and annex back Khmer Kambuja Krom to Cambodia. As other natives of the French Cochinchina, Son Ngoc Thanh' s goal was not very much about the freedom of Cambodia by itself but also of the Khmer Kambuja Krom as well and he decided to work toward it on his own. His movement however catched the attention of the French authority and had to escape to Japan during the crack down. He came back and became Prime Minister of Prince Sihanook' s government when the French Indochina was under the Japanese occupation. He was in a position to make his dream realizing if his political career was stable and long enough under the Japanese rule. During his short stay in power, he had neither full support from the prince nor the opportunity to claim the French Cochinchina from Japan. At the time, the prince' s policy was not to risk any possible retaliation from France. As he expected, the French returned soon after the withdrawal of the Japanese troops. In 1945, Son Ngoc Thanh was arrested and brought to France to be locked in a jail cell at Poitier. The arrest came at the right time that Ho Chi Minh was free to launch his real campaign, after receiving from the American president FDR the commission on driving out the fascist regime from the French Indochina. Following the formation of the Vietminh in 1945, the march toward the south started. It was neither against the Japanese fascist nor the French Vichy regimes, but against the return of France to take back the French Indochina. From late 1950, the Viet minh infiltrated itself into eastern Laos and proceeded to continue on into Cambodia. Facilitated mostly by the presence of the Maoism among Chinese migrants of the seacoast, they continued their communist propaganda into the western part of Cambodia. As Son Ngoc Thanh was jailed in France, there was apparently no serious opposition from the Khmer government. Along the way, the Vietminh formed support groups for the fight against France as well as the propaganda to start on communism. At the second meeting of the Indochinese Communist Party in early 1951, they announced the formation of the Combatant National Front of the Lao as well as of Kampuchea (CPK) under the assumed names of Pathet Lao and the Revolutionary Cambodian People' s Party (Pracheachon). Under the tutelage of the Vietminh, both were incorporated into the Indochinese Communist Party. Nevertheless, evidences show that the Vietminh allowed the Lao court led by Prince Souphanouvong to hold on to some of the leadership of the Pathet Lao, the CPK was on the other hand led by an obscure figure known as Son Ngoc Minh. According to the Khmer source, he was actually a member of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) named Nguyen-Yang-Mieng (Angka: Introduction: P. 7). Of half Vietnamese descended, he spent most of his life in Cambodia. During his youth, he stayed in a pagoda learning the Cambodian language and became a Buddhist monk, of which he earned the title of "Achar" (priest) and people called him Achar-Mien, a concatenation of his associated Khmer title Achar and his name "Mien". His nickname Son Ngoc Minh was, on other hand, another political attempt of connecting him to Son Ngoc Thanh. Many Cambodians thought that he was the brother of this one time Prime Minister of King Sihanouk whose campaign against France was seen as a great act of patriotism. He was commissioned to form the Revolutionary Party of Cambodia in 1951 and continued to lead the organization until his death in 1973. He was joined by another obscure figure named "Achar Sok" with the nickname of Tou Samouth to form the Khmer Pracheachon organization, by regrouping scattered members of the Khmer Issarak (Notes: The zone Leaders). Their new recruits were mostly of bad elements of the contemporary Khmer society who by escaping the Khmer government ' s justice system, ended up taking refuge with the organization. Together, they were trained to become the executioners of the new movement who were responsible for most of the bloodshed after the fall of the Khmer Republic.

The Pathet Lao
To western observers, Laos would never gain its status as a country if French had direct access from Cambodia through the Khorat Plateau of the Siam Country. Through the colonial view, Laos was a part of the Tai country with geography and cultural connection to the Central Asian Tai-Yuan Country. Culturally the Lao people shared the same backward habit of the Khmer people that does not suit the exploitation of the colonists. When Bangkok moved them from the east bank of the Mekong River to the West Bank, the empty land attracted more Hmong migrants from southern China. As had been done in Cochinchina, the mass migration might had been encouraged by the French authority to boost revenue. The opium trade for instance made Champasak becoming the new commercial center of the French colonial rule. Totally disregarding the suzerainty of the royal house of Lan-xang, France declared Laos as a French Colony with its capital centered at Vieng Chan. During the World War II, Lao became prey to foreign interference that had been since crippling the Lao court. Having direct access from the countryside to the internal court of the royal palace, the Vietminh took no time to make its move against this one time French colony. Its interference allowed the left wing an opportunity to take on its own show. Prince Souphanwong devotion to communism allowed him to promote his own ambitious drive to take on control of the Lao court. It started with the occupation of the Vietminh over eastern Laos in the late 1950. After the formation the Pathet Lao, Prince Sophanwong worked along side the Vietminh to start on his own campaign. In an invasion of Laos from Vietnam, they established in 1953 a government in Houaphan province in northeast Laos. With the support of the Vietminh, the Pathet Lao continued on extending its political holding ground into central Laos. By the time that the 1954 Geneva accords required the withdrawal of foreign forces from Laos, the Pathet Lao had already taken control over substantial parts of the country. The accord then allowed the Pathet Lao to establish itself as a regime in Laos' two northern provinces. In spite of the prohibition of foreign interference, the Vietminh never really withdrew from the border areas of Laos and the Pathet Lao continued to operate virtually as a branch of the Vietminh. To keep the Pathet Lao from falling under the control of the Lao government of King Suvanna Phuma, Hanoi created secret units designed to intervene when any attempts of the unification occurred. The unit Group 100 with headquarters at Ban Nameo was formed two months after the conference. The unit effectively controlled and directed the Pathet Lao movement since 1956. Its stated goal was to wage the communist struggle against Western colonialism and imperialism. Despite Hanoi' s effort, a coalition government was established in 1957 between the monarchists and communists. It was collapsed in 1959 bringing about a resumption of fighting. In September 1959, Hanoi formed another special force with the aim of building the Pathet Lao into a stronger counter-force against the Lao Royal government. The group openly supplied, trained and militarily supported the Pathet Lao. The typical strategy during this era was for North Vietnamese regulars to attack first but then send in the Pathet Lao at the end of the battle to claim victory. In the 1960s, more attempts at neutrality agreements and the formation of a coalition government failed. As North Vietnam had no intention of withdrawing from Lao, the Pathet Lao continued to function under the Vietminh. America responded by making connection with Phumi Nosavan who was then the army strongman of the royal Lao Army with the help of the Thai Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat (The Southeast Asian Organization: In defending the American Enterprise: Sarit Thanarat and the Fight against Communism). Once it had gained control of the Ministry of Defense, the Lao army operated virtually independently of the government. The Ministry of Defense then decided to settle accounts once for all with the Pathet Lao. By the middle 1960s, the Lao country had fallen into proxy warfare between pro-US and pro-Vietnamese irregular military groups. Under the SEATO' s initiative, the Royal Lao Army fought along side of U.S. irregular forces (including Air America and other contract employees and Hmong commandos), and Thai "volunteer" forces. In mid-July, in the middle of the rainy season when reinforcement of Remote Mountain garrison by road or air was all but impossible, the Pathet Lao began to re-establish its base area in Huaphan. Within fortnight military posts of the Royal Lao Army in much of the north and northeast of the province had one after the other been overran by Pathet Lao guerrillas. In 1968, the Army of North Vietnam openly launched a multi-division invasion of Laos. The Pathet Lao were pushed to the side in the conflict and reduced to the role of an auxiliary force to the North Vietnamese army. Unable to match the heavy Soviet and Chinese weapons in addition to the numerical strength of the Vietnamese forces, the Royal Lao Army took itself out of the conflict after heavy losses.

The Khmer Vietminh Organization
In Cambodia, a period of peace followed the gaining of independence from France in 1953. Through the Geneva accords, neutrality would allow Cambodia to stay off course from the Cold War. Under the leadership of king Sihanouk, Cambodia was supposed to be left alone to rebuild the country. However, the failure to work out with all other Khmer political factions prevented him to form a true coalition that would safeguard the future of Cambodian suzerainty in the long run. In the process of building his own political party, the Sangkum Reast Niyum, into becoming the sole political party of the country, Sihanouk left other political factions in disarray. Nevertheless he had made serious attempt to attract Khmer intellectuals to join in his political party in the effort to keep the country united. On his request, France agreed to release Son Ngoc Thanh back to Cambodia 1952. Instead of joining King Sihanouk' s government, he went straight into the jungle and joined the Issarak fighters to form the "Khmer Serey". After the Geneva accords were concluded, the members of Issarak soon found themselves stateless and disintegrating. Rejected by the Khmer government, they were split into two factions. One side who still faithful to the original Khmer Issarak' s causes was gathered by Son Ngoc Thanh to form the Free Khmer Liberation Front. As its name implies, the movement was leaning to the free world and was openly backed by America. Stationing in the northeastern part of Thailand and of Vietnam' s western provinces, they recruited their troops mostly from the Khmer communities outside of Cambodia. Other Khmer Issaraks who were close tied to the Communist Party of Indochina were forced to take refuge either in Vietnam or in China. Not long after, some were sent back to work underground in Cambodia under Tou Samuth. While Sung Ngoc Minh stayed in Hanoi to look over the whole of the new organization' s operation, Tou Samuth was in charge of recruiting new members to transform the Khmer Pracheachon Party into a communist party. In conforming to the Geneva accords, the connection with Hanoi was concealed. Nevertheless, they were still referred by Cambodian sources as the Khmer Vietminh since most members were in fact the same Khmer Issaraks who were either hidden in Cambodia or returned back from Hanoi. To hide their true identity, Tou Samuth presented his organization to other communist groups of Southeast Asia as the Indochinese Communist Organization of Cambodia. Of their secrecy, many new Khmer members did not know much about the organization and thought that it was truly part of an Indochinese organization under direct control of the commintern. According to a Khmer researcher, Pol Pot was the only Khmer communist of Paris who was known to have a long history with the organization (Angka: Angka killed Kim Chan the Khmer Rouge of Khmer affinity: P.100). Nuan Chea who was a member of the Thai Communist Party in Thailand said that he was requesting to be transferred into Cambodia to join in the organization to better serve the Khmer communist cause. He might not know then that the organization was actually operating as a subsidiary of the Vietminh. He and Pol Pot acknowledged that their jobs were not very much challenging to them and appeared to be happy working for Tou Samouth. While Nuan-Chea was more involved on day to day operation, Pol Pot helped Tou Samouth in spreading communist ideology. It was apparently a job that suited him well. In an organization that only a few were educated, he made himself shine. Through his charisma and his teaching skill, he projected himself as one of the top communist ideologists of the organization. In recognition, Tou Samouth assigned him to be his personal advisor (Notes: The Birth of the Khmer Communist Party). After Tou Samuth was caught and killed by Lon Nol' s police in 1962. Pol Pot was summoned by Le-Duan to Hanoi for a party meeting. After he came back, Pol Pot would face the real challenge in his new role as the head of the organization. In a tough competition against older veterans with a lot more experiences than him, Pol Pot made himself many enemies that created serious setback later in his rise to power. But for his communist peers from Paris whom he brought later to join the organization, he presented himself very well as their leader. They often praised him for his insight and his aptitude for quick decision-making. One among his first initiative was the start on arm struggle in 1968 during the Samlaut uprising (Notes: The Arm Struggle). Apparently, neither Sihanouk nor Lon Nol knew who were behind the peasants uprising. Nevertheless, they knew that the Communist Organization was still operating under a new leadership after Tou Samuth was killed and the recent disappearance of some key communist members of his government was not just a coincidence (Notes: The Disappearance of Phnom Penh' s Communist Members). Sihanouk called the Organization the Khmer Rouge, due to its affiliation with the new communist Khmer members. Needless to say, the fighting marked the start of the Khmer Communist Party in taking more on their own initiatives. Needless to say, Sihanouk instructed Lon-Nol to fight back hard, but denied any involvement concerning the disappearance of the communists cadre from Phnom Penh.

THE KHMER ROUGE ORGANIZATION
As we had argued, the rivival of the new Khmer Communist Party was very much part of the game plan initiated by China. In the effort to convert the second Indochinese War into becoming a civil war between the Free and the Communist World partisanship of Cambodia(The Khmer Republic: The Fall of the Khmer Republic: The Civil Wars). The delay for a bigger scale of Khmer Rouge involvement in the Vietnam War was primary due in part to the fact that both China and Hanoi liked to have Sihanouk to be on their. Without Sihanouk, they saw the chance of the Khmer Rouge to survive the American aggression was slim. The long awaited preparation paid off when Sihanouk was ousted by the right wing Lon Nol ' s clique in 1970 (From Kingdom to Republic: The Khmer Republic: The Fall of King Sihanouk). In support for king Sihanouk' s call to fight against the Lon Nol regime, Pol Pot' s career was on the rise.

Pol Pot as a Policy' s Maker
As secretary of the Khmer Communist Party, Pol Pot was expected to take responsibility for the party' s policy making. So far there is no written version of his manifesto or any sort of guideline found to prove it (Notes: Pol Pot' s career experience). Trough out his early leadership, he was mostly on the run and had to go to Hanoi or Peking for any major decision about the joint campaign against Lon-Nol. Evidences so far show that his decision of "the arm struggle" during the peasant uprising in Samlaut was not his own. It was in close connection with the Vietcong' s overall campaign to control the rice supply in Cambodia and the Chinese overall plan of escalating the Vietnam War into becoming a full scale as the Third Indochinese war. His decisions appeared to work best for the organization and received praise from his associates (Notes: The Arm Struggle). Following the uprising of the peasants at Samlaut, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge organization could exercise the first time theirs initiative. At the same time, he took the opportunities to spread his groups into many parts of the country and tried to establish controls on strategic zones that were still operating under the Vietminh. The success however angered the Vietminh who had suffered a great setback through the retaliation of King Sihanouk. During the late term of Johnson' s presidency, the prince had secretly cooperated with the American forces in South Vietnam to bomb the Vietcong inside of Cambodia territory. Le Duan later conveyed to Pol Pot that he would no longer condone any more of the Khmer Communist initiative. While continuing to maintain his smiling face, Pol Pot had nurtured a determination to cut off tie with the Vietminh as soon as he can. At the same time, he worked on strengthening his viewpoint about how communities should be operated. Of his own revelation, he said that it was at this time that he became mature with the overall concept of communist doctrine. What he learned from the past by reading books and manuscripts was nothing compared to what he learned from the actual rural Khmer societies during his stay at the countryside. What he was impressed the most was the commune' s lifestyle of the indigenous societies of the remote sites of Ratanak-kiri and Mondol-kiri provinces. Their overall cultural tradition became the key ingredients that he was looking for his own communist model of the Khmer revolution. As we had argued, these indigenous communities were the remnants of ancient Hiong Wang Cakravatin Empire. By working for the community, each family was freed of its own day-to-day routines that allowed them to be more and more parts of the community. Indication shows that Pol Pot saw their village' s cohabitation as a good model for his own cooperative commune system later implemented in his regime (Notes: Pol Pot' progressive Concept of Self-determination). His bright insight might receive a good review from Mao Tse Tong himself for he was promoted further into the future of Indochinese communist Party. In a move to limit the Vietminh from becoming the sole power of the region, China saw in Pol Pot a good candidate for standing up against Hanoi. He had proved himself capable of running an organization that was still very much under the sway of the Vietminh ' s control and transformed it gradually into his own. More to his credit, he had established good relationship with all members of communist intellectual from Paris who would be instrumental later in the formation of the future of the Khmer Communist Party. Pol Pot' s leadership capability proved itself to work well against the Vietminh interference. After the death of Sung Ngoc Minh in 1972, Pol Pot' s time to complete his communist model was running short as he was pressured to take on the full responsibility of the party' s leadership. His gut-feeling also brought up the urgency of finding his way as soon as possible to outmaneuver the Vietminh. By now he was fully convinced that his party would survive and thrive only if it is totally disassociated from North Vietnam. Only after he took care of the Central Committee in 1975 that foreign observers and members of his close acquaintance had witnessed of his real policy making activities, Through visit to the Central committee meeting, they confirmed that he took that position seriously. They noticed of his calm attitude in presenting and explaining the party' s policy. During the training session of his cadres, he impressed his audiences by mostly using rationalism to support his argument. He had certainly conveyed his policy to his subjects fundamentally through deep reflection and presented to his audience in a rational way (Notes: Pol Pot' s Buddhist Background). His lack of emotion was well understood among his peers who were from the same Buddhist background, but for foreign observers, his cool attitude was often mis-associated with hypocrisy. As a modern politician, Pol Pot hardly could claim himself as an honest person.

The Khmer Communist vs the Khmer Pracheachon Party
As other Khmer new recruits, evidences show that Pol Pot and his associates from Paris joined the organization blindfolded knowing not much about the organization that they were going to take part of it (Notes: Khiev Samphan ' s Version of the Organization). After the induction, they were subject to the secrecy that was one of the de-facto codes of conduct for the organization. Until now, evidences show that all the organization' s strategy and policy came from Hanoi (Notes: Angkar Leu). After the Samlaut uprising, Pol POt had proved himself first time not only as a theologian but a sound strategic planner. Through the help of Nuan Chea who took care of the execution, he made himself more and more worth in the eyes of his communist peers as well as the Communist Party of China. That would put him in an odd position against Hanoi in their quest to take sole control of the Indochinese affair. Apparently, the arm struggle had worked against Vietnam as it induced massive air raid by the American army over the Vietminh settlement inside Cambodia. At the same time, the raid also destroyed the rice supply to the Vietcong fighting in South Vietnam (From Kingdom to Republic: The last Kingdom of Cambodia: In the Pursuit of Neutrality). Never again, Hanoi was going to let the Khmer Communist Party to lead another arm struggle against Sihanouk' s government. Le Duan advised him to stay away from another arm struggle and concentrated on the political fight instead (Notes: the Last Interview). For Pol Pot, it was bluntly a Hanoi' s strategy to keep him and his party powerless. Growing more dependent on the Vietminh, Pol Pot had to walk on the thin rope. The first concern was obviously to do not make open confrontation with Le Duan. As long as he did not show of his intention to take charge, he knew that he was safe in the shadow of the Vietminh. In that situation, Pol Pot had never established control over the whole of the Pracheachon Party that was ran by Sung Ngoc Minh until his death in late 1972. To recall back, Hanoi did form the Khmer Pracheachon Party by recruiting and training all of its members (From Kingdom to Republic: The Treat of Communism: The Maoists at Work). Its main objective was to draw Cambodia into the Vietnam' s war without inducing suspicion from the International community of breaking the Geneva accords. Pol Pot had to keep secrecy inside the organization for his own safety. Under the strong scrutiny of Hanoi, evidences show that Pol Pot continued to administer his Khmer Rouge unit with more or less support from China. From his own revelation, Pol Pot conveyed that he knew of the Vietminh' s real intention and ever since tried to outmaneuver Hanoi in the attempt to draw Cambodia from the bad outcome of the Vietnam' s War. When King Sihanouk called for help in 1970, Khiev Samphan (Not Pol Pot) was set in charge in the "Royal Khmer Government of National Union" to fight the Lon Nol regime. Apparently it was Pol Pot' s own decision to stay in the background in avoiding more conflict with Hanoi. In March 1970, Sihanouk had submitted a plan to Cho En Lai on how the Khmer Government of National Union is formed. Pol Pot is given the plan for review. Except for minor things, he agreed for Sihanouk' s plan to be carried out. Nobody told King Sihanouk that Pol Pot was there to review his plan. Instead of going to meet the king in person (as suggested by Chou En Lai), he wrote a letter to accept the proposition naming Khiev Samphan, Hu Yuan and Hu Nim as representative of the Khmer Rouge Organization (HKam: Democratin of Kampuchea: P.187-188). In his return to Cambodia, he was asked by Le Duan to form a coalition force in the arm struggle against the Lon Nol ' s regime. Pol Pot' s answer was negative citing that fighting along side the Vietminh was not good for his party; Le Duan seemed to agree. Nevertheless, he already took the advantage of King Sihanouk call to infiltrate his own fighting groups deep inside Cambodia. To validate their action, he instructed them to wear Prince Sihanouk' s insignia on their uniform. At the same time, they recruited from the former Vietnamese expatriated from Cambodia who could speak Cambodian fluently to join in the regular fighting groups that were already settling deep inside of Cambodia. While the Vietminh did the fighting, Pol Pot and his associates took the opportunity to strengthen their position inside the Khmer Rouge Organization. With the support of China, he officially formed the central committee and started to establish some control over the zone leaders. Needless to say, His success story did not please Hanoi that would do anything in its power to prevent him from taking full control of the organization. From his own word, Nuan Chea revealed of a situation that Hanoi exerted hardship on the new organization through secret agents implanted inside of the organization. These suspicion that led to the purging of internal opposition members later in the history of the Khmer Rouge Organization. When asked, Nuan Chea kept on insisting that Hanoi interference was a matter of life and death, not only to the members of the Khmer Communist Party, but to Cambodia as a country itself.

The Royal Khmer Government of National Union
According to Khiev Samphan, Pol Pot was a true believer of the class struggle within the communist doctrine. From the start, he had nothing less than great admiration for the zone leaders' self-determination and reliance that enabled them to survive all the hardship during the fight with the colonial rule. After the pull out of the Vietminh in 1954, these former Issarak members were mostly left to themselves to concern about their day to day survival under the scrutiny of king Sihanouk' s government (HKam: Republic Democratic of Kampuchea: The Original History the Kampuchea Communist Party: P. 136-137). After the Geneva accords, Tou Samuth was set to replace Sung Ngoc Minh (but still reporting to him in Hanoi) to transform the group into a Khmer communist organization. Sung Ngoc Minh was moved to Hanoi to oversee the whole organization as a Zion of the Vietminh Party. After joining the organization, Pol Pot was given a job to instruct communist doctrine that was supposed to transform them into becoming communist fighters. Being of peasant background, they were actually remnants of the ancient Angkorean feudality in education and mentality. For Pol Pot who looked for a sound connection of communism with the Angkorean might, these Issarak fighters were actually ideal in both of their class' s status and their fighting experience. It was perhaps one of the mistakes that he acknowledged later after the fall of his regime. As we shall see, he found out later that most of them were corrupted by their powers and to his dismay, were acting like warlord kings instead of becoming good communists as expected of their good nature. Evidences show that Pol Pot used all his political skill and to some extend Chinese intervention, to transform them into becoming members of the Khmer Communist party (better known as the Khmer Rouge). When Sihanouk decided to crack down the Khmer Rouge Organization in 1969, many of its Khmer Vietminh members escaped to Hanoi. Fighting with the Vietminh for a long time, they trusted them more than the young revolutionary Pol POt. They came back in 1970 when the deposed prince called for an arm struggle against the Lon Nol regime. The next formation of the "Royal Khmer Government of National Union" was a tricky business (From Kingdom to Republic: The Fall of the Lon Nol' s Regime: The Civil Wars). While King Sihanouk and Khiev Samphan took the lime light as the head of the Chinese backed Khmer Government, the Vietminh took care all the rest governmental affair. At the same time, Pol Pot and his party withdrew themselves into the safety zone of Angkor Wat and set up their command center there. Evidences show that during the rest of the time, they were left inactive in the fight against Phnom Penh for the whole time. Facts finding confirm that major battles inside of Cambodia were conducted by the Vietcong until at least late 1972 (Notes: The Vietcong Fighters). It was the same scheme that Hanoi successfuklly shifted the blame to King Sihanouk for all their works done in building in using the Ho-Chi-Minh trail, after the Geneva' s accord. Now that King Sihanouk was himself ousted from power, they used his name again for all theirs incursions inside of Cambodia. While the outside world was talking about Khmer recruits fighting for him against the Lon Nol regime, actual witnesses confirmed that the North Vietnamese soldiers did all the fighting (Gate: Chapter 2: P. 14-27). By late 1972, the Vietminh had disabled the Lon Nol Army to the point of no possible recovery by inflicting total damage along the way (Notes: The War of Destruction). The destruction confirmed the Khmer source ' s claim of Hanoi intentionally destroying Cambodia to disable the Lon Nol' s Regime for the last taking, with no discussion whatsoever with either king Sihanouk or Khiev Samphan. While the Vietminh concentrated their effort inside of Cambodia, the South Vietnamese situation was getting worst for the Vietcong forcing the Vietminh to make some adjustment of their priority. With less interference from North Vietnam, The CIA led American Phoenix Program apparently started to bear its result (Note: The Phoenix Program). Nevertheless, the return of the Vietminh interference would change the whole situation. For long, King Sihanouk have anticipated that when the Vietminh would get their victory, Cambodia would be no longer exist (The Southeast Asian Organization: The Impact on Cambodia: King Norodom Sihanouk and the Stance against SEATO). Circumstances also brought the Khmer Rouge ' s leader Pol Pot to share the same view (Notes: Pol Pot in cooperation with King Sihanouk). The Paris Peace Talk between the Vietminh with America through a common goal of eliminating the Khmer Rouge alarmed King Sihanouk. He had made his first trip to meet the Khmer Rouge cadres into consolidating their effort in standing up to the American threat. During all this time, evidences show that Hanoi still holds on to the rein of the combatant front under King Sihanouk' s name. With the pressure from Peking, Hanoi complied at the moment to arm the Khmer Rouge.

THE FIGHT WITH IMPERIALISM
After moving the headquarters to Siem Reap, the Khmer rouge started expanding its political strength. The new event brought the United States and Hanoi to meet in Paris to find a common ground in stopping the Khmer Rouge to take over of the situation. The American president Nixon condemned the rise of the Khmer Rouge because he knew as well that they would win over the Lon Nol regime and subsequently would help China in controlling Southeast Asia. For the Vietminh, the rise of the Khmer Rouge meant the end of their ambitious goal to form the unified Indochinese communist state under their control. Considering that the Khmer Rouge was still in its early phase of building its strength, it is now or never that the two (America and Hanoi) could stop the Khmer Rouge to grow stronger.

The Paris Peace Talks
Following his own doctrine, the American president Nixon tried to stop the Khmer Rouge' s successful drive by initiating the talk with the Vietminh through the Paris accord. They concluded the agreement by committing to the withdraw all American troops from Vietnam. Both declared that the accords would help the restoration of peace by leaving Vietnam, Cambodia in Laos to take care of their own affair. Both Washington and Hanoi knew quite well that without American troops, Hanoi would become the sole master of the battlefield. Kissinger used the offer to negotiate with Pham Van Dong who stood firm in defending Hanoi' s interest in the talk. While a member of the negotiation team briefed the Lon Nol' s government before the signing of the agreement, the Khmer Rouge was mostly left in the dark. America asked Hanoi to inform the Khmer Rouge of whatever they decided for them even being tipped by Le Duc Tho that Pol Pot was at the time not cooperating with them. On the other side, Sihanouk was tipped along with the promises that he would be back in power after the resolution was passed. He nevertheless rejected the proposition citing that it was now too late (Notes: King Sihanouk' s Reply). After the Khmer Rouge rejected the Paris Talk, America restarted the war and this time it was solely against the Khmer Rouge organization. To Pol Pot, the war allowed him to test the efficiency of his own model of self-defense. With not much ground to cover, the Khmer Rouge managed to evade the American massive bombing by infiltrating themselves deeper and deeper into Lon Nol' s controlled territory. At the same time, refugees flocked into cities that were still under Lon Nol' s control. They soon found out that they had to fend for themselves and to make the matter worst had to endure the hardship of the war. While the cities were entertaining corrupted officials with the borrowed dollars from America, the inflation of the cost of foods and other mean of surviving skyrocketed. On the other hand, the American bombing continued to destroy the rice fields and the last of Lon Nol' s sources of revenues. Without the Vietminh on their back, the Khmer Rouge started on their own initiative to take back the countryside. The decentralization had proved to work best for the zone leaders to take care of their own controlled territory. Each zone' s performance was achieved differently depending upon its own situation. For the liberated zones, Pol Pot' s communist model could be implemented fully without setback. Under the center' s directives, each zone started on implementing it commune cohabitation to accommodate people that were left behind at the countryside. With self-determination villages were grouped together to form a central community and used combined resources for self-sustainment. At the start, the cohabitation also worked well since each family had its own resource to contribute to the cooperation. At the mean time, they inducted the people into communist doctrine and called them Pracheachon Chast (the old people). They became the backbone of the organization that used them to administer new communities in accommodating new conquered people fresh from the front line. Under the center' s guideline, So Phim and Ta Mok then took the opportunity to recruit and train their own army to protect the community. It is proved that they were discipline and efficient in the battlefield, far surpassing the Lon Nol and even the Vietcong troops themselves. On the other zones, the achievement was far less noticeable due to the war still in action. As expected, the northwestern zone was ranked the last of the performance list. With no controlled territory, the recruits were done mostly inside the city. With their background much in question (in regard to their class' s status) the recruits apparently did not received much trust for the center. When the American congress ordered the Nixon government to stop bombing in August 1973, evidences show that Pol Pot was already ahead in his plan to take control of Phnom Penh. As Lon Nol was reduced to be a passive contender of the overall conflict, King Sihanouk came into agreement with the Khmer Rouge to continue fighting on their own. His first trip to the Khmer Rouge controlled zone was done in October 1973 to symbolize the shift of command from the he Royal Khmer Government of National Union to the Khmer Rouge Central Committee. It is fair to say that Pol Pot decision to stand against the Paris Peace accord had paid off big time. Pol Pot later declared the stop of bombing to be his party' s full victory over the American Imperialism (Notes: Pol Pot vs Imperialism). The American public was right in condemning the bombing to be actually a contributing factor to the Khmer Rouge strength. What they did not know was that the victory was obtained with a lot of sacrify and the dependency with Hanoi still continued (Notes: The Lon Nol' s View of the Bombing). After the bombing stopped, Hanoi came back to restart the Vietnam War inside of Cambodia again. After infiltrating back into Cambodian territory, they took the opportunity of the weak-link between the zone leaders and the Center to interfere during and after the fall of Phnom Penh (From Kingdom to Republic: The Fall of the Lon Nol Regime: The Fall of Phnom Penh).

The Fall of Phnom Penh
The fall of Phnom Penh in April 1975 came with enigmas. First, the Khmer Rouge Organization that took credit for the fall was itself very much obscure. The lack of information led the foreign observers and Cambodian people alike to make all kind of speculation. The misconception that the Khmer Rouge organization was run solely by the Khmer Communist Party was common to western observers. They were fed by refugees who started to pour out from the country during the early evacuation of the cities. In reality, the situation was much more complicated than projected by this western total view. Betrayed by Hanoi, we shall see that the Khmer Rouge Organization had to endure the massive bombardment from the American warplanes (The Indochinese Communist Party: The Fight with Imperialism: The Paris Peace Talks). After the bombing stopped, King Sihanouk set out to form his own accord with the Khmer Rouge. His trip was arranged and accompanied by the Vietminh cadre through the Ho Chi Minh trail. While King Sihanouk and Pol Pot discussed about forging ahead to fight the Lon Nol regime, the Vietnamese cadres were themselves trying to make contacts with the zone leaders to form their own alliance (The Great Paradox: The Third Indochinese War: The Change of Face of the Cold War). As much as Pol Pot wanted Hanoi to be out of the Cambodian affair, he knew that he could not make it without armament that passed through China through Hanoi. In that situation, many outstanding questions (the killing of all Lon Nol' s governmental members who had chosen to stay behind to negotiate) were answered prematurely as the works of the communist Khmer Party. Only the fall Of the Khmer Rouge Organization itself in January 1979 that the Khmer Standard Total View could be formed and published. Of their documents left behind in S21, scholars were able to verify eyewitness' s account of the events that were really occurring during the fall of Phnom Penh. According to new eyewitness accounts, the attack on Phnom Penh had been divided and held by each zone' s army separately (Cam: The Zero Years: P. 76-77). At the heart of the city, the deputy front commander Koy Thuon of the northern zone established his headquarters at the hotel Monorom. It was there that a committee for wiping out enemy was set up to take care of the urgent resolution to be made (Pol: Men in black: P.271). Its first task was to take care of the Lon Nol' s designated committee members for negotiation who were detained at the Information Ministry. They were taken out to be killed in the ground of Circle Sportive. In the following days, seven or eight hundred politician, high-ranking officials, police and army officers were killed and thrown into common graves on the road to the airport. In the mind of the chaos, the evacuation of the city' s people soon started. Eye-witness also confirmed that measures were carried on differently from zone to zone. On the same note, the fall of Phnom Penh automatically brought down the other cities that were still under Lon Nol' s control in submission. In Battambang, the celebration was a lot less dramatic than in Phnom Penh as the people waited anxiously for the arrival of the victors. During the first day, no activity was going on but the call to surrender the weapons started at dawn. The next day, a few Khmer Rouge Soldiers wearing black pajamas with sandals made of tires and a Cambodian Kramar on their neck, carrying the French automatic rifles AR 15 that were known to date since the French colonial era. They were followed by men in the same uniform but of much more sophistigat appearance, carrying pistols and arriving on western cars. They were immediately recognized by the locals to be the Khmer Rouge Kammaphibal (administrative) of the northwestern zone (Notes: The Composition of the Northern Zone Kammaphibal). Unlike their compatriots in Phnom Penh they responded to the town' s greeting warmly. They gave meeting to inform interested city people about some guideline of their organization or Angkar. After the meeting, younger soldiers showed up for an asking spree for wristwatches, jewelry and other personal belonging in the open streets. The collection of vehicles, motorcycle and other high-price items were requested by the next days in the name of Angkar, from house to house. All the collected goods were not put in used by the local Khmer Rouge, but were shipped away to unknown destination. Eyewitnesses confirmed later that they were actually transported by train and by boat under the supervision of Vietnamese soldiers (Angka part II: Where went all the properties of the Khmer Kingdms?, P 2-6). Another event that took place during the first week of the Khmer Rouge arrival was the roundup of Lon Nol' s governmental official and military commanders. Convinced that they were to meet King Sihanouk in person, they showed up in theirs best uniform with all their ranking and medal in open display. They were then loaded on trucks and proceeded to the highway 5, in the direction of Phnom Penh. Not long after, the same trucks came back to take on the next loads. Khmer Rouge Kammaphibal later confirmed the rumor that they were massacred along the way and that their corpses were left rotten in the open field. A few escapees from the massacres confirmed that the local Khmer rouges organized the round-ups, but later handed them over to the executors who were from different secret units and were Vietnamese. They killed them with artillery and high power guns.

The Fall of Saigon
The fall of Phnom Penh on April 1975 and the failure to bring up negotiation with the Khmer Rouge would weight heavily on the South Vietnamese situation. With the stop of bombing on Cambodia, evidences show that the Vietminh was already infiltrating through the northeastern zone into South Vietnam to make the last assault on Saigon. They could not wait for the Vietcong to recover from many years of intense crackdown by the CIA led Phoenix Program. Breaking openly the Geneva Accord, the Vietminh moved their own troops against the South Vietnamese government. On April 30 1975, the Vietminh forced themselves into Saigon with virtually no resistance. The rapidity with which the South Vietnamese position collapsed was surprising to most American and South Vietnamese observers alike. A memo prepared by the CIA and U.S. Army Intelligence and published on March 5 indicated that the South Vietnamese army could hold through the current dry season (i.e., at least until 1976). Pol Pot' s decision to attack Phnom Penh before the Vietminh had a strong implication on Hanoi' s own plan to attack Saigon. Evidences show that it had been planned by the North Vietnamese and their allies since the fall of Phnom Penh. Like the Khmer Rouge, the Vietminh was not interested anymore in the negotiation with America. The delay so far might have been due to the waiting of a more prospective war booty that they can collect from the fall of Phnom Penh and the clean up of the Lon Nol regime for the Indochinese State affair to be completed. At the same time, America already found out that the attempt to negotiate with the Khmer Rouge along with the surprise attack on the latter had failed. The pressing of the Vietminh ' s attack was on the other hand a total surprise to Washington. The American evacuation planning was obviously ordered against other administration policies that were already set in place. The American president Ford still hoped to gain additional military aid for South Vietnam. Throughout April, he attempted to get Congress behind a proposed appropriation of $722 million, which might allow for the reconstitution of some of the South Vietnamese forces that had been destroyed. Kissinger was opposed to a full-scale evacuation as long as the aid option remained on the table, because the removal of American forces would signal a loss of faith in Thieu and severely weaken him. Despite all the good publicity, the American Intelligence knew little about Hanoi' s sudden change of direction. The urgency forced the American president to order the exit from Vietnam in an unexpected way. The massive evacuation of the top leadership to secure the safety of the Thieu' s government' s members abroad had been completed one day earlier. Many officials who missed the planes managed to leave the country by their own mean (FS: Refugees). While American citizens were generally assured of a simple way to leave the country just by showing up to an evacuation point, South Vietnamese who wanted to leave Saigon before it fell often resorted to costly arrangements (Notes: The Cost of exiting Vietnam). Understandably, theirs fate was still better than most of Lon Nol' s cabinet members and soldiers who were left behind to try another round of negotiation and were later exterminated. Most Americans and citizens of other countries allied to the United States wanted to evacuate the city before it fell, and many South Vietnamese, especially those associated with the United States or South Vietnamese government, wanted to leave as well. The result was a massive migrating pattern rarely known in the modern world, occurring during and shortly after the fall of Saigon. Apparently, the Vietminh closed theirs eye and allowed the boat people to take on their risky journey because it spared them from being victim of theirs own harsher treatment. In contrast, there were high numbers of war casualties that had been applied to the South Vietnamese government (Notes: National Review of South Vietnamese Government' s casualties). As to the non-Vietnamese nationals, the Kambujan Krom in particulars, we only could assume of an even higher numbers of casualties than their South Vietnamese counterparts. This was because the Vietminh, as the Vietcong had a long reputation of genocide pogrom against minorities and foreigners during the war (Notes: Vietcong ' s Genocide Pogrom).

Reference:

HSEA: A history of Southeast Asia, by D.G.E. Hall
SEAPP: Southeast Asia Past & Present, by D.R. Sardesai
WWA: At War with Asia: Essays on Indochina, by Noam Chomsky
LRW: Last Reflections on a War, by Bernard B. Falls
VN45: Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power, by David G. Marr
VQDD: Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang, by Van Dao Houng, translated by Khue Huynh
KK: Kamboja Krom: The Power without the Khmer Krom' s people, By Trang Chat But.
Angka:Who was Angka? (Angka Chea Narna?), by Kim Thy Ouy
Pol: Pol Pot: Anatomy of a Nightmare, by Philip Short.
VNW:Vietnam: The Necessary War, by Michael Lind
PL: Pathet Lao, Wikipedia.
Gate: The Gate, by Francois Bizot
HKam: The History of Kambuchea, by Khiev Samphan
WWWO: When the War was Over, by Elizabeth Becker
Cam: Cambodia 1975-1982, by Michael Vickery
FS: The Fall of Saigon, Wikipedia.
CIUP: Communist Indochina and U.S.Foreign Policy:Postwar Realities, by Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown

Notes:

Chronology
1848: The Communist manifesto was written by Karl Max (1818-1883); 1919: The Communist International (Comintern) was founded by Vladimir Lenin; 1922: The foundation of the Soviet Union; 1930: The formation of of the Indochinese Communist Party; 1933-1945: Franklin D Rosevelt (Democrat) became president of USA; 1939-1945: World War II; 1940: Japan took access of Indochina; 1941: Japanese air raids bombed Pearl Harbor; 1943: Mao Tse Tung became the chairman of of the Communist Party of China; 1945: The foundation of the Vietminh in Indochina and the abdication of King Bao-Dai; 1949: The People' s republic of China was established; 1954: The Geneva accords separated the Vietminh' s controlled arear from the south along the 17th parallel; 1955: The Vietnam War started; 1957: Phibunsangram was toppled by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat; 1961-1963: John F Kennedy (Democrat) became president of USA; 1963-1969 Lyndon B. Johnson (Democrat) became president of USA; 1969: Death of Ho Chi Minh; 1969-1974: Richard Nixon (Republican) became president of USA; 1972: Death of Sung Ngoc Minh; April 12 1975: The Lon Nol' s regime ended with the fall of Phnom Penh; April 30 1975: The Vietnam War ended with the fall of Saigon; 1976: Mao Tse Tung died;
Agriculturist society vs Communism
As we had argued, Agriculturist society was formed under Brahmanism. In the past, peasants worked on their own lands and received crops from their harvest for themselves. In China where market places became the central economic swapping of goods, middle agents exploited the peasants through trading procession. Maoism applied by eliminating the class of middle agents and the formation of the state own distribution centers of goods. In Cambodia, the Cinicization had brought the same exploitation problem by the market place that made Maoism becoming a good model for communism.
The ICP' s Casualty
Those leaders captured and subsequently executed included the Party' s general secretary, Nguyen Van Cu, a former general secretary, Ha Huy Tap, the Comintern' representative to the ICP, Le Hong Phong, and the ranking female ICP member Nguyen Thi Minh Khai.
Pol Pot' progressive Concept of Self-determination
In relation to communism, he could relate their commune life style to the class of a worker instead of peasant ' s. His model was supposed to resolve once for all the problem of applying the corporate Maxist-Leninist model to Cambodian case with no restriction. He also noticed the self-initiative of the villagers in procuring the day-to-day food supply and the overall conduction of village' s affair through self-determination by the villages elders. As we shall see later, Pol Pot' s stance for self-determination had serious drawback on the young Khmer rouge organization in conducting the state affair. In economy, the urge of self-sustainment created an economic backdrop that led to starvation.
Pol Pot' s Career Experience
Evidences show that until the death of Son Gnoc Minh, Pol Pot spent most of his time with the organization writing commentaries for him rather than having a direct executive function required as Tou Samouth' s replacement. It was a job that suited him well considering that he was more inclined to ideology' s kind of work than becoming an efficient executive of the party.
Pol Pot' s Buddhist Background
In his granted interview with the Yugoslave journalists, he conveyed his background in Buddhism to have 6 years living in a monastery and 2 years to be ordained as monks. He then acknowledged (rather nervously) to them that he is Buddhist and it is the time that he reveals his biography to the world. For a communist who claimed himself as one of the top progressive ideologists of the communist world, the revelation might set him in an awkward situation of a reactionist. Evidences prove moreover that Pol Pot included many aspects of Buddhism in his own personal conduct as well as in the core of his Cambodian communist model. At the same time, he also banned contemporary Buddhist practices in his regime.
The zone Leaders
The zones were the legacy of the Vietnamese-dominated period of the First Indochinese war. The zone leaders or zone secretaries took cares of each zone independently. Under Tou Samuth there were six zone leaders of executive branches: Roah Ngim and Kong Sophan were taking care of the Northwest region, Pauk of the Northern region, Ney Saran of the Northeast, Su Phim of the East and Ta Mok of the Southwest. (HKam: The Interference of the Communist Vietnam consecutively in the internal Affair of BKK: P. 219)
Khiev Samphan ' s Version of the Organization
In his "The History of Kambuchea", Khiev Samphan appeared to know little about the organization' s background prior to his induction. All information given was not of his own recollection, but mostly retrieved from the work of international' s researchers. It leads us to believe that Khiev Samphan and other Khmer members from Paris were not considered as insiders of the organization and no detail information were passed to them during the induction.
The Birth of the Khmer Communist Party
There was apparently an unofficial secret meeting in 1960 to change the Khmer Pracheachon Party into the Khmer Communist Party. The meeting also elected Tou Samuth for the first in the Party' s command, Noun Chea the second and Pol Pot the third. The change might have been Hanoi' s scheme to allow the induction of Pol Pot' s communist peers from Paris to join the organization in starting the arm-struggle against the neutral Sihanouk' s government. As Tou Samuth was still reporting to Hanoi, it was nothing changed except the name of the organization that would hide Hanoi' s interference in the eye of Geneva' s accord inspectors. Nevertheless, Pol Pot later claimed it as the real birth of the Khmer Communist Party.
The Arm Struggle
According to Khiev Samphan, Pol Pot ' s decision to start the arm struggle with Lon-nol' s army was later praised to be of good judgment from most his close circle. As normally done in a communist state, it received a good review from all the Khmer rouge cadres. It started at Samlaut that was known as a small peasant' s community of the Battambang province where once stationed a Vietminh combatant group against the French Colonial rule. It was one among many places that Lon Nol bought their rice supply in the deal with the Viet Cong.
The Disappearance of Phnom Penh' s Communist Members
Noun Chea later acknowledges that he helped Khiev Samphan and other communist members to escape from Phnom Penh to Battambang at the time that the uprising at Samlaut started.
Le-Duan ' s secret units inside of Cambodia
There was no indication that China or Pol Pot himself knew about this at the time. For Pol Pot whose primary concern was to build the Khmer Rouge' s credibility, the denial of Vietnamese involvement set the Khmer Rouge organization as the sole responsible party of the Khmer tragedy, in the eye of westerners.
Angkar Leu (The higher Angkar)
It became the tradition of the Organization to send people for study at the higher Angkar that was at the time Hanoi. Since many did not return back, it was assumed that they were executed. These measures were applied in place in Kambuja Krom under the control of Vietminh (AngkaR Part 2: The Vietminh killed the Khmers of Kambuja Krom: P. 63). Evidences show later that they were set in place in the Vietminh controlled territory of Cambodia as well. It became since a tradition for the organization to refer "Angkar Leu" as a death penalty.
The last Interviews
As revealed later during his last interview to the Free Khmer Radio, Pol Pot claimed that Hanoi had picked on him. He said that he knew (met) all of them and that they were very cruel.
The Royal Khmer Government of National Union
The Royal Khmer Government of National Union (GRUNK) was formed to help Sihanouk fighting the Lon Nol Regime.
The Khmer Rouge Central Committee
The Khmer Rouge Central Comittee (or the Center) was formed as a secret administrative center of the Khmer Communist Party. Pol Pot made himself the brother # 1 to take on the policy-making, Nuan Chea who became second in the ranking carried on the commands for the execution. Ing Sary who was third in the ranking took care of the foreign affair. He was the main contact with King Sihanouk at Peking. Of all the six zone leaders, only the northern and northeastern regions were close under the central committee, nevertheless So Phim of the eastern region was ranked fourth and Ta Mok of the Northwestern zone was ranked fifth.
The Vietcong Fighters
Fact-finding shows that most fighters who were accountable for fighting inside Cambodia until 1973 were Vietnamese. The assumption was based on the dead communist fighters inside Cambodia left during each fighting on the battleground. Only after 1973 that dead communist fighters could be identified as Cambodian. Through the call of King Sihanouk, members of the Khmer rural people joined in the front to fight the American. It took a number of years for them to take on their own fight.
Pol Pot vs Imperialism
As stated later by Pol Pot himself, the Vietnam War became now a war between the Khmer Rouge Organization and the American Imperialism. For him, the American congress' s vote to stop the bombing was not an act of kindness toward the Cambodian people, but was instead forced upon them by the high cost of the air raids. He concluded that the Cambodian people had thus won over the imperialism by their own merit. The victory also confirms the soundness of his communist model based on the Angkorean inspiration.
Pol Pot in the Khmer Government of National Union
Evidences show that Hanoi was still laying claim to the Khmer Rouge Organization through the Khmer Pracheachon Party, headed by Sung Ngoc Minh. The nomination of Khiev Samphan instead of Pol Pot to head the Khmer National Front indicated the unsettlement of Pol Pot and his Khmer Communist Party to take charge of the organization. With the zone leaders more or less under Hanoi' s control, Pol Pot decided to stay still in the background. By this time, the fracture between him and Hanoi was already aggravated. He could not risk any more confrontation until he was able to build a central army for the Center.
King Sihanouk' s Reply
King Sihanouk simply replied that it was too late. As we had argued, Sihanouk had approached the American government to work out a deal to solve the Vietminh ' s affair (From Kingdom to Republic: The Fall of the Monarchy: The Fall of King Sihanouk). Now that Cambodia was in shamble and the Lon Nol ' s army was virtually destroyed, the only organization that could stand against the Vietminh was the Khmer Rouge.
The Phoenix Program
The Phoenix Program was a program designed, coordinated, and executed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), United States special operations forces, special forces operatives from the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV), and the Republic of Vietnam' s (South Vietnam) security apparatus during the Vietnam War. The Program was designed to identify and "neutralize" (via infiltration, capture, terrorism, torture, and assassination) the infrastructure of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF or Viet Cong). The CIA described it as "a set of programs that sought to attack and destroy the political infrastructure of the Viet Cong". (Wikipedia: Phoenix Program)
The War of Destruction
To start, the attack on the Pochenton' s air port resulted in Lon Nol' s air power totally destroyed. The attack on the infantry unit at old stadium destroyed Lon Nol' s last stock of tanks and also destroyed the only inter-highway bridge from Phnom Penh to Chroy Changwa.
Pol Pot in cooperation with King Sihanouk
Contrary to the common belief that King Sihanouk was virtually prisoner of Peking and later of the Khmer Rouge regime, evidences show that he was much more free to take on his own initiative. His actions however were restricted to the coalition cause that was closely supervised by China and Hanoi. Khiev Samphan later confirmed that as outsider of the Central committees, they were not allowed to make decision in the Center' s protocol. Pol Pot still treated them as allies but mostly made all the recommendation through the central committees virtually by himself. It remains unclear how his guidance was actually passed on to the zone leaders to be executed. Evidences show instead that the Vietminh worked directly with the zone leaders in carrying on the chain of commands.
The Lon Nol' s View of the Bombing
To the Lon Nol' s government, the American air power is necessary and Indispensable. As confirmed by the general Sosthene Fernandez, the Vietcongs were very much active in many parts of the countries. It was in contrast to International believers that the Vietcong were at the time largely in the little-populated northeast, where they maintained the Ho Chi Minh trail network (CAM: The Price of Trusting America: P. 116). In 1974 Pol Pot went to China to request for help equipping the new recruits. With a recent frontier' s clash with Hanoi (who did all the arm ' s delivery to the Khmer Rouge), China advised Pol Pot to take care by his own mean. As much as they wanted to, King Sihanouk and to the less extend Pol Pot could not prevent Hanoi to take part in the recruiting inside of Cambodia. In the eastern zone, their interference was well noticeable. It was the Vietminh cadres who did all the training. As Hanoi provided most armament and uniforms were, the eastern zone army looked and behaved more like the Vietminh than to the Khmer Rouge army. On other zones, Hanoi' s intervention varied.
The Dependency of the Khmer Rouge Of Hanoi
Sihanouk told me in Romania that in 1973, "But since the second half of 1972 we are autonomous. Arms and ammunitions deliveries have been finished since January 1973. (CAM: The Price of Trusting America: P. 114)
The New zone Organization
The zones had been reorganized and reassigned after the first purge (WWWO: The Ultimate Revolution: P.194). The Northern Zone that was run by Koy Thoun during the War, was divided into the new Northern zone and the Central zone. Koy Thoun was later purged by the organization. The special zone (around Phnom Penh) was placed under Vorn Veth as secretary. The Central zone was under Ke Puak, the Northeastern Zone under Men San and the Northern Zone under Kong Chap. The South Eastern Zone was divided into the new Southwestern Zone and the western zone. While the Southwestern Zone was still placed under Tamok, the new western zone was under Chou Chet. The Eastern Zone was unchanged under So Phim.
The Paris Peace Talk
A cease-fire would immediately follow the signing of an agreement; All U.S. troops would be withdrawn within 2 months of the signing, and both sides would simultaneously release their prisoners; 2 South Vietnamese political groups (the Government of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu and the communist Provisional Revolutionary Government) would "do their utmost" to reach a settlement in 3 months; A "National Council of Reconciliation and Concord" (NCRC) would be set up, based on the agreement of the South Vietnamese parties, to supervise elections; All North Vietnamese infiltration of personnel into South Vietnam would cease; and The United States would pledge to contribute to the economic restructuring of Indochina
The Composition of the Northern Zone Kammaphibal
Most were actually former teachers of the Battambang province.who joined the Khmer Rouge organization, some prior to the Samlaut uprising but most after the fall of Sihanouk regime. Many of their peers were still teaching at the Battambang province and had participated more or less with the movement during the war.
The Cost of exiting Vietnam
The under-the-table payments required to gain a passport and exit visa jumped sixfold, and the price of seagoing vessels tripled. Those who owned property in the city were often forced to sell it at a substantial loss or abandon it altogether; the asking price of one particularly impressive house was cut 75 percent within a two-week period. American visas were of enormous value, and Vietnamese seeking American sponsors posted advertisements in newspapers.
Vietcong ' s Genocide Program
In 1968, PAVN and National Liberation Front (NLF) forces had occupied Hue for close to a month. After the communists were repelled, American and ARVN forces had found mass graves. A study prepared for the U.S. mission in Vietnam indicated that the communists had targeted ARVN officers, Roman Catholics, intellectuals and businessmen, and other suspected counterrevolutionaries. More recently, eight Americans captured in Bu�n Ma Thuet had vanished and reports of beheadings and other executions were filtering through from Hue and �� Nang, mostly spurred on by government propaganda (FS:Evacuation).
National Review of South Vietnamese Government' s casualties
Of the tens of thousands of former South Vietnamese collaborators with the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. military and countless armed forces officers and personnel in risk of reprisal, nothing of this subject matter is known. In 1977, National Review reported that some 30,000 South Vietnamese had been systematically killed using a list of CIA informants left behind by the US embassy.